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The paper is devoted to formation of the modern corporate governance system in Kyrgyz 
Republic. The main factors that influence this process have been studied, e.g., legal back-
ground  and  practice  of  privatization;  corporate  and  antimonopoly  law;  financial  markets; 
stakeholders  activities,  etc.  The  authors  conclude  that  there  were  significant  positive 
changes in the sphere of corporate governance in Kyrgyzstan. First of all it should be marked 
that in the country that had no previous experience of private property and market, institu-
tions of corporate governance were formed, there was a process of learning of both owners 
and managers how to govern the company using the available set of laws and regulations. 
But this process is far from being complete, since the real corporate relations are still very 
dysfunctional. In the authors’ opinion, improvement of corporate governance in the country 
requires  a  complex  approach:  upgrading  of  legislation  must  be  accompanied  by  active 
measures aimed at improving the situation in all spheres that influence the quality of corpo-
rate governance. The main task in this sphere is creation of favorable legal and institutional 
climate which would lead to improvement of common norms of corporate governance and to 
attraction of external investments.  
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1. Privatization and evolution of ownership structure 
1.1. Privatization program and its realization 
1.1.1. Privatization program 
One of the main trends of the economic and social reforms conducted in Kyrgyz Re-
public (KR) is formation of effective market relations in the economy. The main source of the 
creation of a competitive private sector is privatization of the state property and reduction of 
the state control over the economy. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the processes of de-etatization and privatization started at the end of 
1991, virtually immediately after gaining of independence.
1 Now, at the moment of the re-
search, they are 14 years old. Currently the seventh privatization program
2 is being imple-
mented. Every privatization program was developed for the period of several years
3 and had 
to include the following: 
•  Tasks and goals of the state policy in the sphere of privatization for the current period. 
•  Definition of the objects included in the program. 
•  Methods and means of privatization of the state property.  
•  Forecast of privatization revenues.  
•  Forecast of the volume of investments related to privatization.  
•  A list of the groups of objects exempt from privatization due to the reasons of defense, 
state security and social development. 
•  Questions related to the environmental protection and public health, as well as retain-
ing state monopoly in some sectors.  
•  Procedures of evaluation of the state property being privatized. 
The core of the KR privatization legislation is the Civil Code and the Act on Privatiza-
tion of the State Property in Kyrgyz Republic. Now, the privatization act of March 2, 2002 is in 
force. The law defines the contents of the program of the state property privatization, partici-
pants of privatization, methods of privatization, methods of transforming state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) into joint-stock companies (JSCs), procedures of privatization of the state-
                                                 
1 The official date of achieving independence is considered to be August 31, 1991.  
2 The press calls it the fifth program. 
3 Initially the programs were developed for the period of 2 years and later for the period of 3 years. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
 
 
  7 
 
owned enterprises that has been transformed into joint-stock companies, procedures of cal-
culation of the starting price, managing privatization income and its redistribution.  
Mechanisms that ensure implementation of norms of the legislation are defined in the 
following regulations: 
•  on general conditions and the order of the state’ property privatization; 
•  on the procedures of the state property privatization by management contracts with an 
option for buy-out, on auctions, tenders, by leasing buy-out, by direct sale; 
•  on the procedures of case-by-case privatization etc.; 
and in methodic recommendations:  
•  on the evaluation of the property and objects of privatization; 
•  on the evaluation of land lots owned by the state etc. 
The law envisages that in the process of evaluation of the state property not only bal-
ance methods of evaluation should be used, but also the methods of market valuation. This 
greatly  broadened  the  list  of  by-laws  directly  or  indirectly  influencing  on  the  privatization 
processes. E.g., one should mention: 
•  the Act on Evaluation; 
•  “Standards of evaluation to be used by the subjects of evaluation activity”; 
•  “Provisional rules of evaluators’ and evaluation organizations’ activities”; 
•  regulation “On the Council for Evaluation Activity Development under the State Prop-
erty Committee,” etc. 
Realization of each privatization program led to improvement of the legislation, more 
precise definitions, overcoming of misunderstandings and contradictions. The following Gov-
ernment regulations and President’s decrees have contributed to this:  
•  acts on implementation of the de-etatization and privatization programs and on further 
steps aimed at development of the de-etatization and privatization processes; 
•  acts on the effects of the KR economy functioning; 
•  measures directed against violations and neglects that have been made in the process 
of privatization.  
1.1.2. Stages of privatization
4  
On various stages of privatization priorities were given to various tasks that had to be 
solved  taking  into  consideration  the  social  and economic  situation  in  the  country.  In  Kyr-
gyzstan, like in many other countries of the former Soviet Union, there was no experience in 
the  reforming  of  the  state  property,  thus  the  process  of  privatization  required  continuous 
                                                 
4 On the basis of the speech of Prime Minister of KR N. Tanaev before the deputies of the Parliament 
Jogorku Kenesh “On the privatization of the state property in KR,” October 2004. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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analysis of the passed stages and drawing of adequate conclusions in order to avoid the 
repetition of the same mistakes. The implementation of every stage was carried out taking 
into account the conclusions made and experiences that had been accumulated. Every stage 
had its own positive and negative results.  
The first stage of privatization
5 was characterized by implementation of two privatiza-
tion programs for 1991–1992 and 1992–1993. On this stage the legal background for privati-
zation and attraction of investments was created, as well as the relevant organizational infra-
structure. The main accent was made on the “small” privatization of trade objects, catering 
and consumer services. Small and medium-sized enterprises were sold to their employees. 
Large enterprises were commercialized and after that up to 75% of their shares were sold to 
employees at a reduced price. The remaining shares were intended to be sold on the coupon 
auctions later. Positive effect of the “small” privatization manifested itself in the implementa-
tion of market relations in trade and services and in the creation of competitive environment.    
At the same time, the process of privatization was burdened by the sins of bureaucracy 
and subjectivism. Plans of privatization were created by local administrations without taking 
into account the real situation of enterprises. Then these plans were made more concrete for 
separate regions and sectors in the form of a certain set of indices. Their achievement was 
supervised by the administrative organs of lower level, who prepared quarterly reports. For-
mally, the final decision on the privatization method to be applied to every concrete enter-
prise was made by the State Property Fund (SPF). It should be said that decisions on the 
value of each enterprise, way of payment, ownership structure and amount of shares passed 
to employees were very subjective. In reality, the SPF, or in fact a privatization commission, 
as a rule, approved the propositions developed by employees and managers.
6  On the first 
stage of privatization, out of the 10,000 objects belonging to the state that were taken as a 
basis on January 1, 1991, 44% have been privatized.  
The second stage of privatization is characterized by the realization of two privatiza-
tion programs from: 1994-1995 and 1996-1997. The main tasks of the second stage were 
carrying out of mass privatization and reorganization of large and medium-sized enterprises 
in industry, transportation and construction. It is a little bit of a paradox that the government 
made a special accent on the fact that the quality of privatization is more important than its 
speed while starting the mass privatization.   
                                                 
5 Julian Pańków claims, that there were 4 stages before 2004. See J. Pańków, Progress, rezul’taty i prob-
lemy protsessa privatizatsii w Kyrgyzskoy Respublike, “Issledovaniya i Analiz” (“Studies and Analyses”), no. 223, 
Warsaw: CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, 2001. 
6 J. Pańków, Progress, rezul’taty i problemy protsessa privatizatsii w Kyrgyzskoy Respublike. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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On this stage, the mass (coupon) privatization has been implemented. Every citizen 
was provided with coupons and the opportunity to get shares of privatized enterprises in ex-
change for them.
7 The goals of the mass privatization were not achieved fully: 
•  investment funds haven’t started to work effectively; 
•  there was not enough investment demand for the privatized objects from the popula-
tion;  
•  managers of attractive and profitable enterprises had been trying to buy out the cou-
pons from the population before the coupon auctions started to be held. 
By the end of the stage, almost a quarter of the KR population became shareholders. 
For the first time, the problems of privatization of enterprises showing signs of bankruptcy 
became addressed at this stage. Despite the slowdown in the speed of privatization proc-
esses, it can be said that by the end of the period, the formation of the private sector have 
been basically completed. 
On the second stage, out of 10,000 objects of the state property that were taken as a 
basis on January 1, 1991, 63% have been privatized.  
In 1998, the third stage of privatization started. In the framework of this stage, two 
programs of privatization: 1998-2000 and 2001-2003 were implemented. Currently the priva-
tization program of 2004–2006 is being carried out. The main characteristics of the structural 
changes of contemporary stage are the reforms in the strategic sectors of economy, privati-
zation of sanatorium and SPA institutions and privatization of the remaining blocks of shares 
not sold at the previous stages.  
At this stage of privatization, the restructuring of strategically important sectors of coun-
try’s economy has started:  
•  “Kyrgyzenergo,” ”Kyrgyzgaz” — fuel and energy; 
•  “Kyrgyztelecom” — communications; 
•  “Kyrgyzstan Aba-Joldoru” — transportation, the national carrier. 
Privatization of strategic objects is carried out by stages and in accordance with the 
specially developed programs for each stage that are approved by the Parliament (Jogorku 
Kenesh). In the framework of such programs, the governments control is provided over some 
strategically important enterprises that are considered to be in the sphere of national inter-
ests of the republic and those that ensure its national safety.  
Privatization of such objects is a very sensible process for the whole population of the 
country. The society is constantly watching the activity of the Government and the Parliament 
related to the privatization of strategic branches as it is associated with the raise of tariffs.  
                                                 
7 About 50% of all coupons were exchanged for the stocks of businesses. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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This, in turn, may have serious social consequences in the nearest future that could be also 
related to decline of the standard of living of the population.
8   
Thus, for the whole period of privatization of the state’ property in KR, by the end of 
2004 7,149 businesses were transformed.
9 The gross value of the transformed state property 
amounts to 15,124 million soms.
10 Assets worth 3,353 million soms were passed for free to 
employees and the population. 
 1.1.3. Speed and methods of privatization 
In 1991-2004, out of 10,000 enterprises designated for privatization 71% were privat-
ized. The diagram 1 shoes the dynamics of privatization measured by the number of privat-
ized enterprises.  
Diagram 1 







































Source: The National Statistic Committee (NSC).  
 
As you can see on the diagram 1, the second and third stages of privatization are 
characterized by slowing down. Differences in speed at subsequent stages have some ob-
                                                 
8 In the Attachment 3 there is an article published by MSN related to this question.   
9 The NSC data. 
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jective reasons related to the characteristics of enterprises subject to de-etatization, as de-
scribed above. The slowdown within the periods was due to the flaws of the legislative base. 
Out of the total number of privatized enterprises, on the first stage 62% of them were privat-
ized, this figure falling to 27% on the second stage and to 11% on the third one.
11  
After the events of March 24, 2005 that led to the changing of power in Kyrgyzstan, the 
process of privatization was put on hold, as there were and still are found multiple violations 
of legislation and order of privatization. There are some tendencies for reprivatization or even 
for nationalization of privatized state property.
12 
Currently, entrepreneurs demand the results of privatization to be acknowledged by the 
authorities and privatization to be continued in a transparent manner. The Public Prosecutor 
Office, on the other hand, instituted many proceedings on the facts of illegal privatization of 
the state property. Several officials of the SPF were accused of illegal action and 13.21% of 
shares of the Kant cement plant were returned to the state.  
According to the SPF experts, passing of the new Act on Privatization of the State 
Property in KR of March 20, 2002 made possible to make the whole process of privatization 
fully transparent, to attract more participants for the auctions, to increase competition and 
thus to obtain higher prices for the privatized property. Such approach provides for prime use 
of competitive methods of privatization compared to the method of direct sales.    
On diagrams 2 and 3 the dynamics of using various methods of privatization on prac-
tice is shown. 
                                                                                                                                                         
10 Except for enterprises in agricultural sector.  
11 During  the  first six  months of  2005 the  blocks of shares  of six  joint-stock  companies  were  sold  for 
38 million soms.  
12 However, according to the Chief Prosecutor, reprivatization is not foreseen except for the cases of clear 
violation of law. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
 
 
  12 
 
Diagram 2 
Methods of privatization at different stages of privatization 
 
Diagram 3 
Stages of privatization and methods used  
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If we look at the use of methods of privatization during various stages, we can agree 
with the opinion of the SPP experts mentioned above that was mentioned in the report of 
Prime Minister in October 2004. But if we look at the data of the NSC from the perspective of 
methods used, we will see a different picture. Apart from commercialization, direct sale was 
the leading method through the whole period, although according to the law, it could be used 
only in special cases after trying to sell the enterprise twice and only to those objects that 
had not been not sold on open auctions. Although in 2003 a reduction of direct sales and in-
crease of tenders and auctions was observed, this trend didn’t prove to be sustainable and in 
2004 the situation returned to the previous state. 
Speaking about privatization revenues for the state budget, 1,354 million soms were 
received by the budget which was less than planned. For example, in 2001–2003 only 556 
million soms were received instead of the expected 900 million. This is explained by the fact 
that some objects included in the privatization program failed to attract investors.  
All in all, we can say that the efficiency of the privatization policy on all the stages was 
not very high. The process of privatization was characterized by high level of politicization 
and low level of public support that created the opportunity for populist calls – sometimes 
successful – for slowing down privatization, its stoppage or for reviewing its results (the latter 
even became one of the slogans of the March revolution). There are many influential special 
interest groups in the country that are not interested in privatization: officials, enterprises get-
ting various rents, misguided population. This leads not only to the slowing down of privatiza-
tion, but also to the real threat of de-privatization (being in fact a re-nationalization) and/or to 
redistribution of property justified by the need to overcome violations and to restore justice. 
Too many goals were set for privatization, especially on the initial stages, when privati-
zation was regarded as a panacea or a means for solving various social problems. Quite of-
ten the goals were too numerous and sometimes mutually contradictive which made their 
realization  harder.  Some  restrictions  on  the  privatization  were  excessive  –  there  are  still 
many sectors where privatization is restricted or forbidden due to some political, ideological, 
group, bureaucratic and other reasons. In particular, it concerns the monopoly sectors that 
provide public services. The quality of the legal regulations was also very doubtful – privati-
zation programs and legal acts were in some respects too ideological and very frequently 
contradicted  each  other  and  other  laws.  E.g.,  in  privatization  programs  there  were  some 
terms and instruments absent in the act on privatization. Provisions of the law were often lim-
ited and/or changed in by-law acts prepared by the executive power, including SPF. 
Speaking about quantitative results of privatization it should be said that compared to 
the other countries of the former Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan looks quite positive. The degree of 
completion of both “large” and “small” privatization is the highest in the region, coming close Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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to the one of the Central European countries; private sector produces about 75% of the GDP 
— comparable, for example, with Poland.
13 
But still, privatization is still far from being completed and its results are highly uneven 
across sectors. There are some sectors that are almost fully privatized: banking, trade, cater-
ing, household services, and there are some that are practically untouched like infrastructure, 
social sector and energy. Currently, everything that was “easy” to privatize politically or tech-
nically is already privatized. As a result, the following objects stay under the state control:  
•  not attractive (both small and controlling blocks of shares); 
•  not privatized for political, ideological, group etc. reasons; 
•  not to be privatized because of their public importance, when realization of their func-
tions is more important that their microeconomic effectiveness. 
Privatization of enterprises was not followed by the privatization of the land they stand 
on. Although the privatized objects have the right to use this land and in fact, the circulation 
of such land is possible, it is very difficult and restricts the opportunities of the enterprises to 
implement their business strategies.  
1.2. Changes in ownership structure after privatization  
The initial ownership structure formed right after privatization was characterized by a 
quite large share of insiders. According to various research insiders possessed, in general, 
from 42% to 50% of all the shares of privatized industrial enterprises (including 17-20% in the 
hands of managers).
14 But the main shareholder was the state itself, that averagely owned 
44% of shares and in 53% of all the enterprises surveyed the state was the largest owner. 
Outsider non-state owners were infrequent and foreign investors were also very rare. But 
even then the concentration of property was quite high: at almost 40% of all the enterprises, 
the controlling block of shares belonged to one person and at 3/4 of enterprises it belonged 
to only three persons.  
Ownership  distribution  and  redistribution  had  various  speed  in  different  companies 
which led to the creation of many types of ownership structures. In post-communist coun-
tries, their formation usually goes along two axes. The first one is the concentration of prop-
erty – from dispersed among many owners to concentrated with clearly defined controlling 
blocks of shares. The second one denotes the level of “outsiderization,” i.e., whether the 
                                                 
13 Transition Report 2004: Infrastructure, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London 
2004. 
14  P.  Kozarzewski,  J. Kuźma,  Privatiziruyemye  i  privatizirovannye  promyshlennye  predpriyatiya  Kyr-
gyzstana. Rezul’tay empiricheskikh issledovaniy, “Issledovaniya i Analiz” (“Studies and Analyses”), no. 119, War-
saw: CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, 1997; I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. 
Kan, S. Kuklin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh predpriyatiy Kyrgyzstana, “Issledovaniya i Analiz” (“Studies and 
Analyses”), no. 221, Warsaw: CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, 2000.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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property remains in the firm (when employees and managers are the main owners) or prop-
erty rights go outside of the firm.  
The four points of these axes describe the four typical ownership structures, originating 
during privatization in many post-communist countries:  
1) Dispersed property in the hands of many employees of the firm; 
2) Concentrated property in the hands of management of the company; 
3) Dispersed property in the hands of outside shareholders (portfolio ones for example) 
4) Concentrated property in the hands of external strategic investors. 
Four main groups of owners that have special interests, behavior and aims correspond 
to these four types of structures. 
Unlike many other post-communist countries, in Kyrgyzstan, at least before 2000, there 
was almost no ownership “leakage” from the firms (see Table 1). Moreover, there was a 
trend of increasing of the insider shareholdings while the state sold its shares. Initially the 
concentration went in a quite special way, too, through two independent channels: there was 
some concentration in the hands of managers who bought shares from non-managerial em-
ployees,  and  at  the  same  time  external  investors  accumulated  ownership  by  purchasing 
shares from the state. The latest research proved that ownership concentration and emer-
gence of strategic investors or affiliated shareholders possessing the controlling block shares 
take place first of all in the companies with no state shares.
15 
Table1 
Average ownership structure of the surveyed companies (in %) 
Owner  Initially  In 2000 
1. State  43.6  18.7 
3. Domestic banks. funds and other financial institutions  0.5  1.0 
4. Other domestic companies  1.7  5.2 
5. Former employees of the companies  4.2  7.2 
6. Other citizens of KR  4.0  6.9 
7. Foreign investors  1.7  4.9 
8. Managers  16.6  29.1 
9. Other employees  25.5  23.1 
10. Other  2.2  3.9 
Source: I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. Kan, S. Kuklin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh 
predpriyatiy Kyrgyzstana, “Issledovaniya i Analiz” (“Studies and Analyses”), no. 221, Warsaw: CASE – Center for 
Social and Economic Research, 2000. 
 
According to the survey held in 2004 in 89 joint-stock companies, in the majority of 
companies where there was no state shares there was a shareholder owning more than 10% 
                                                 
15 The cited survey included a representative sample of 151 industrial enterprises from the SPF registry. 
The main topics of the research were: changes in ownership structure, corporate governance formation, restruc-
turing, and financial and economic situation. See: I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. Kan, S. Kuk-
lin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh predpriyatiy Kyrgyzstana, “Issledovaniya i Analiz” (“Studies and Analyses”), 
no. 221, Warsaw: CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, 2000. This sample is somewhat narrower 
than the sample used for the current research. The latter includes all the sectors of the economy (the share of 
industrial enterprises is 93%) as well as enterprises for some reasons not included into the SPF registry. 84 en-Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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of shares. In every second surveyed company there was a shareholder (or related share-
holders) owning more than 30% of shares, and in every second surveyed company without 
state shares there was a shareholder (or related shareholders) owning the control block of 
shares. The state share is still very high – in 2/3 of surveyed enterprises it accounts for 50% 
of shares or more.
16 
Diagram 4 
Predominant type of ownership at enterprises (in % to enterprises)  
 
Source: I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. Kan, S. Kuklin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh 
predpriyatiy Kyrgyzstana. 
 
The changes in the ownership structure were caused by many factors. They were the 
state policy, level of development of market infrastructure, economic situation and investment 
attractiveness of enterprises, goals of major players on the stock market and in the compa-
nies, and many other. There were numerous vectors of the impact of these factors. For ex-
ample, practical incapacity of some firms made them not attractive for outsider private inves-
tors. On the other hand, such firms were very active in looking for such investors and in 
many cases they were successful. Kyrgyzsan is not an exception: despite the fact that the 
degree and the speed of de-etatization (transfer of shares from the state to private hands) 
                                                                                                                                                         
terprises were idenitified as present in both samples although the real number may be bigger because of prob-
lems with identification caused by possible changes of enterprises’ names and registration numbers. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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was in general higher on profitable enterprises, unprofitable firms very quickly went under the 
control of external non-state investors (see Table 2)    
In general, the survey showed the reluctance of insiders to release the control over the 
firms. For the most managers (and other employees) this control was, generally, more impor-
tant that the search for investments. The passing of part of the property to “strangers” was a 
forced measure to avoid the collapse of the firm. But usually not the strategic investors used 
this situation but the creditors organization to which this firm was indebted. 
Table 2 
The largest shareholder and gross profitability in 1994 (in % of firms with given 
profitability)  
State  External investors  Management  Common workers  Profitability in 
gross  initially  in 2000  initially  in 2000  initially  in 2000  initially  in 2000 
Negative  75.0  45.0  10.0  40.0  5.0  10.0  10.0  5.0 
Positive  48.5  17.8  12.9  26.7  14.9  36.6  23.8  18.8 
Source: I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. Kan, S. Kuklin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh 
predpriyatiy Kyrgyzstana. 
 
As a result, in the privatized sector of Kyrgyzstan one of the most widespread are the 
“insider” forms of ownership structure (types 1 and 2) and the third form is almost nowhere to 
be found. This is related to the narrow and underdeveloped stock market. The state share is 
still very large. According to the above mentioned newest surveys, it still owns a controlling 
block of shares in about 1/3 of all enterprises.  
The share of external concentrated owners, especially foreign (apart from the banking 
sector) is still not very large and not only because of insiders’ resistance that looses its actu-
ality at the present stage of privatization (privatization of large objects, mainly in infrastruc-
ture, where insiders are not able to act as a part of a deal), but mainly because of the lack of 
domestic capital, low attractiveness of the objects and very unfavorable investment climate 
(high corruption, faulty legislation and restrictions for foreign capital in privatization of some 
objects and land lots). Low volume and low quality of direct foreign investments (FDI) is the 
Achilles’ heel of the Kyrgyz economy. The country holds one of the last places in the CIS ac-
cording to the level of the FDI per capita. Mainly the regional capital and the capital of dubi-
ous origin (“fled” capital that is now returning through off-shore territories and men of straw) 
enter the country. Apart from insufficient infusions into the economy, such situation blocks 
the transfer of knowledge, technology, experience, access to markets and so on. All that 
could be provided by foreign investors of “the first-class” (with good track record, out of de-
veloped countries).  
                                                                                                                                                         
16 Issledovaniye praktiki korporativnogo upravleniya v aktsionernykh obschestvakh Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki, 
Bishkek: Center for Corporate Development under the Government of KR, 2004. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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2. Development of financial markets 
2.1. Banking sector 
The banking system of the country consists of the National Bank of KR (NBKR), com-
mercial banks and microfinance institutions (MFI). The activity of commercial banks is regu-
lated by the Act on Banks and Banking in KR adopted in 1997. According to the act, a bank 
is created in the form of joint-stock company and acts on the basis of the license issued by 
the NBKR. The main regulation of the microfinance institutions activities is the Act on Micro-
finance Institutions in KR adopted in 2002.   
2.1.1. Commercial banks 
Banking sector of KR is represented by 19 commercial banks. 14 out of them have for-
eign capital participation out of which in 9 banks foreign capital share is more than 50%. On 
average, the share of foreign investors in the authorized capital of Kyrgyz banks by the end 
of 2004 was 46.5%. Foreign capital is represented by banks of Russia, Kazakstan, Pakistan, 
Korea and Turkey. There is also a bank founded by several international financial institutions 
(International Financial Corporation, Aga Khan Fund, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the Government of KR).  
Capitalization of commercial banks in 2004 equaled to $55 million. The dynamics of the 
financial mediation indices given in the diagram 5 shows that the presence of the banking 
sector in the economy is gradually increasing.  But its role is still can’t be compared not only 
to developed countries, but also to closest neighbors such as Russia and Kazakstan. In the 
period under review, the share of the banks’ assets in GDP increased 2.5 times and now 
amounts to 18.6%. The volume of net credits having also increased almost threefold in com-
parison to 2000 in relation to the GDP, amounts to modest 6.2% in 2004.   Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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Diagram 5 
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However it should be said that the stable microeconomic situation, growth of economy, 
decrease of the inflation rate and stabilization of national currency during the last years pro-
vided for dynamic development of deposit and credit market (Diagram 6). 
The  main  category  that  caused  the  broadening  of  the  deposit  base  of  commercial 
banks were à vista deposits of legal persons. Time deposits of legal persons and deposits of 
population were also increasing, but slower. But the increased inflow of new deposits was 
accompanied by decreasing interest rates.  
The increase in the assets of the banking system and the inflow of foreign capital to the 
banking system of the republic provided for accelerated growth of the volume of credits given 
to the real sector. Growth rates of credits in foreign currency were higher than that in soms. 
The growth of the credit portfolio was accompanied by improving of its quality. The propor-
tions of overdue debts in the joint credit portfolio of banks reduced. One more positive ten-
dency of 2004 is the increasing of the long term credits’ in the structure of credit portfolio 
from 21.5% to 27.5%. Nevertheless, the average term of credit repayment is still quite low 
and equals to 14.8 months.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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Diagram 6 
























In national currency In foreign currency
 
 
Some reduction in the cost of resource base of crediting allowed the banks to reduce 
the credit interest rates. Average annual credit interest rates in national currency totaled to 
24% and in foreign currency – 18.9%. The reduction of the interest rates for new credits has 
been observed in practically all categories and branches and the volatility of rates decreased 
considerably. Together with the reduction of nominal interest rates, a reduction in the real 
cost of credits was observed. It achieved its minimal level since 2000 and was as low as 
19.8%. 
Concentration index of credit portfolio of the banks has decreased and by the end of 
2004 equaled to 10.7%. It means that the crediting market has been divided between the 
banks. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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Diagram 7 
























In national currency In foreign currency  
 
The analysis of the banking system structure regarding the segments of large, medium-
sized and small banks, shows that the structure of the banking sector is not stable.
17 Cur-
rently the average amount of assets of the four largest Kyrgyz banks is $22 million ($14 mil-
lion – $53 million). The increasing share of the large banks in 2004 can be explained by the 
appearance of several Kazakstan banks on the Kyrgyzstan financial market. But the analysis 
of the efficient use of assets and capital shows that small banks are the most effective. And 
the largest bank (i.e. the bank with the largest share on the market) is the least effective, as 
its leading position is determined only by the increase in cash assets.
18  
                                                 
17Banks are classified according to the average bank’s share in total assets, credits and deposits: “large” –
more than 10%, “medium-sized” – 5-10% and “small” – less than 5%.   
18 Tendentsii razvitiya bankovskoy sistemy KR, NBKR: Bishkek, 2004.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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Diagram 8 
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Although there are some positive tendencies in the development of the banking sector, 
it still experiences serious difficulties. The amount of deposits is not enough for stable devel-
opment of the real  sector  that  is  in  high  need of  cheap  credit resources.  Population  still 
doesn’t trust the banking sector. This is due to the limited resources of most commercial 
banks and disadvantageous conditions on which credits are given: 
•  interest rates, having the tendency to decrease, are still very high. Besides, there is a 
tendency give preferential credits to affiliated companies or simply “friends.” The Table 
3 shows the conditions of crediting in the largest and most stable banks of KR; 
•  credit attractiveness for potential clients is substantially limited by very high collaterals 
requirements which reach 150-200% of the amount of credit;  
•  a lot of banks have no opportunity to prolong credits that is partially related to the terms 
of deposits that usually are not longer than one year. Such credits are not attractive for 
companies as they are too short for their business cycle, especially in agriculture and 
industry. Diagram 9 is a clear illustration of the situation. More than a half of banking 
credits is used in trade. The share of credits for industry and construction is only 15% 
of the banking sector credit portfolio. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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 Table 3 
Credit conditions in the largest banks of KR, 2004  
Annual interest rates, % 









Kyrgyz Investment and 
Credit Bank 
50 thousand. 
– 1 million 
14-16  14-16  Flexible  Up to 7 
Energobank  5 thd. – 1 mln.  15  15  150-170  Up to 7 
Bank Kyrgyzstan  200–50 thd.  –  20-28  150-200  Up to 3 
Ineximbank  100–400 thd.  30-35  11-28  120-150  Up to 7 
Promstroybank  200–500 thd.  10-50  10-35  120-150  Up to 1 ½ 
Bank Bakai  500–100 thd.  30  26  300  Up to ½ 
Kazkommercbank Kyr-
gyzstan 
2–450 thd.  20-35  18-28  Flexible  Up to 3 
Demir Bank  1–400 thd.  –  10-25  140  Up to 1 
Source: How do companies in Eurasia finance their trade/investment deals, BISNIS 2004. 
 
Diagram 9 
Structure of credit portfolio of commercial banks of Kyrgyz Republic, 2004 
Individual citizens, 9%
Construction and 







2.1.2. Microfinance organizations 
The main task of the microfinance organizations (MFO) is the support and development 
of the social mobilization of the population. It is aimed at strengthening of capabilities and 
broadening opportunities for poor people in overcoming poverty, in developing their profit-
making activity, and increasing their independence by providing access to microfinance re-
sources. MFOs are not a part of the banking system: they give small loans to target group of 
citizens and use their own principles of crediting. MFOs can operate using their own assets Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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or with the help of loans from local and international financial institutions. The latter is very 
important for the Kyrgyz microcrediting market. The largest donors of MFOs are: the World 
Bank,  the  USAID,  Asian  Development  Bank,  the  International  Financial  Corporation,  the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Tacis, German Development Bank, 
and the Government of KR (which uses for this purpose 3% of privatization revenues and the 
employment fund of the Social Fund).  
The donors that implement microfinance programs in KR are: 
•  international organizations: Mercy Corps International, FINCA, Financial Fund “Bai Tu-
shum;” 
•  local non-governmental organizations: Citizen’ Fund of Microcrediting, Financial Fund 
“Kyrgyzayiltrust” and others; 
•  State  organizations:  Kyrgyz  Agricultural  Financial  Academy,  Financial  Company  for 
Support and Development of Credit Unions, State Fund for Support of Small and Me-
dium-sized Business under the Government of KR, State Department of Employment in 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection; 
•  local  commercial  banks:  Ineximbank,  Kyrgyzstan  Bank,  Demir,  Kazcommercbank–
Kyrgyzstan, Energobank; 
Microcredits are given to a group of people or to a person. As a rule, when financing a 
group, no material collateral is required. A “social collateral” is used instead – joint amenabil-
ity of the group of credit takers or guarantees issued by a third party. Some creditors use col-
lateral principle. A principle of orientation on the credit taker himself is often used, on his/her 
desire to work and be persistent in achieving the goals set. 
By the end of 2004, there were 78 MFOs registered. The share of microcredits in the 
whole credit volume is 15%. Microcrediting activity is mainly directed towards inhabitants of 
large cities. This is proved by the fact that the amount of assets directed for agricultural cred-
its (to the main activity in rural areas) is only 16.1% of the total MFOs credit portfolio. The 
main object of crediting by MFO is the trade sector. The volume of credits for this sector in  
2004 was 75% of the whole credit portfolio of MFOs.
19 
The average size of a microcredit in 2004 was around $500, achieving its maximum 
value in real estate sphere — $5000. As a rule, microcredits are given for one year, and only 
1/5 of all MFOs give them for up to three years. Interest rates of microcredits are, in general, 
5% - 6%, lower than for other credits. 67% of MFOs prefer collateral in the form of real es-
tate, others work on the basis of non-collateral system. Recurrence of credits is averagely 
96%.
20 
                                                 
19 Tendentsii razvitiya bankovskoy sistemy KR. 
20 Sostoyanie mikrofinansovogo sektora v Kyrgyzskoy Respublike, Bishkek: “Expert” Agency, 2004. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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2.2. Securities market  
Issue and circulation of securities and the questions of state regulation of securities 
market in KR are regulated by the 1998 Act on the Securities Market. The supreme organ of 
state administration that is in charge for the integral state policy related to securities market 
is the State Commission for Securities Market under the Government of KR (SCSM). It per-
forms the following functions:  
•  develops the main directions of development of securities market and coordinates all 
the governmental activities on this field;  
•  develops relevant legal acts and supervises their execution; 
•  approves the issue standards for securities; 
•  holds the unified registry of securities; 
•  develops the unified standards and rules of professional activity with securities, includ-
ing  reporting  by  issuers  and  professional  participants,  preparation  of  methods  of 
evaluation of corporate securities, of keeping the shareholders registry, conducting of 
clearance and depositary activity; securities keeping custody;  
•  establishes the compulsory requirements and other conditions for issue and circulation 
of securities; 
•  issues licenses for professional participants of the securities market; 
•  registers issues of securities; 
•  supervises the activities of professional participants of the securities market.  
•  provides the common informational space on securities and financial markets, creates 
an open-accessed base with information on issuers, professional participants of the 
securities market and on its functioning; 
•  approves qualified requirements for professional participants of the securities market 
and contributes to their professional growth. 
 
During the first 8 months of 2005, 35 objects were audited by State Commission for 
Securities Market. The results show that most violations of securities legislation in KR is re-
lated  to  initial  distribution  of  shares  during  the  privatization  of  firms,  general  meetings  of 
shareholders and non-payments or wrong calculation of dividends. 
On the stock market of KR three licensed securities traders operate: Kyrgyz Stock Ex-
change (KSE), Stock Exchange Trade System, Central Asian Stock Exchange. According to 
the results of 2004, 86% of all securities trade in value was done at the KSE.  
The KSE was founded in 1994. The first auctions and official opening took place in May 
1995, when the process of privatization was in full swing. On the initial stage of its existence, 
the KSE operated as a membership-based non-commercial organization with 16 members. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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In 2000 it was commercialized. The Istanbul Stock Exchange became one of the core inves-
tors of the KSE. In 2001 the Kazakstan Stock Exchange also became a shareholder which 
allowed the KSE to increase significantly its programming and technical potential. Currently 
the KSE is a “closed” joint-stock company with 17 shareholders. Membership was abolished 
by the general meeting of shareholders. The relations with participants of biddings are con-
tract-based. 
In accordance with the Act on the Securities Market, the KSE develops and approves 
its own rules of listing and delisting of securities. To get the permission to be included on the 
quoting list, an issuer must submit a standard set of documents to the listing department of 
the KSE. If the decision is positive, the contract is signed between the issuer and the KSE.  
The securities of the issuer can be given one of the three categories of the quoting list 
– A, B or C. The main difference between them relates to capital requirements and to the 
date of the foundation of the issuer organization. So in order to get the A category, own capi-
tal must be no less than $5 million (in soms according to the exchange rate of the NBKR) 
and the organization must exist (to pass the initial state registration as a legal person) at 
least 5 years. For B category, the capital must be no less than $1 million and the firm must 
exist for more than 3 years. And for C category, the capital must be at least $250 thousand 
the company must exist for at least 1 year. Other requirements for including the securities 
into the list are the same for all the categories. 
The stock exchange has a right to exclude the securities from its quoting list on the fol-
lowing grounds: 
•   the indices of issuer activity do not conform to the requirements for entering the quot-
ing list; 
•  upon request of the issuer;  
•  liquidation of the issuer or if the issuer is declared bankrupt; 
•  cancellation of state registration of securities issue, included into the quoting list; 
•  expiration of securities circulation;  
•  failure of the issuer to meet the obligations of the agreement. 
Some issuers can be excluded from the list temporarily by the decision of the KSE. 
Having solved the problems that led to the exclusion, the issuer is restored on the list.   
During the ten year of operation, 34,145 transactions were made on the territory of the 
KSE on the sum of 6.3 billion soms or $138 million. During the last five years, in spite of the 
decrease  in the  amount  of transactions (see  Diagram  10), their  value has  increased  two 
times and in 2004 equaled to 2.2 billion soms or $51 million. This shows that the turnover on 
the stock market of the republic is not large and big transactions can influence it greatly. Now 
only 8 companies are the regular players of the stock market. Since 2003, only one fifth of Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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the total trade volume of securities is made by the companies that passed the listing proce-
dure. 
Diagram 10 











































Volume of auctions by all securities and financial instruments  
Amount of deals by all securities and financial instruments    
 
From January till August, 2005, 2,263 thousand transactions on the total sum of 787.6 
million soms were made. It is 26% less than in the same period of the previous year. As 
usual, 80% of all the trade was held at the KSE. 
There was an attempt to revive the almost dead stock market with the help of adminis-
trative methods. According to the current legislation, all securities transactions must be regis-
tered with the KSE, no matter where they were made. Besides, the privatization program pro-
vides for selling all the remaining state shares through the KSE. Such policy gives KSE the 
functions  not  designated  for  it  and  lowers  the  quality  of  the  organized  securities  market. 
Currently and in the nearest future the role of KSE is objectively restricted by the lack of 
stock market players: population has no money and institutional investors are almost absent. 
As a result, the KSE does not implement any of the most important functions of the stock 
market, i.e. market evaluation of enterprises and provision of capital. 
The results of the survey conducted in 2000 show that the weakness of the organized 
stock market comes from the reluctance of the firms to participate in it as well. Many manag-
ers were very skeptical about listing of their stocks at the KSE – only 38% of all respondents 
were positive about it. In the case of listed companies (their number was not very high in the Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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sample – only 13%), more than a half of the managers positively evaluated this fact and only 
20% negatively. The firms controlled by external non-state owners generally were positive 
about the stock exchange and the firms with dispersed employee ownership were negative.
21 
Probably  the  main  reason  of  negative  attitude  towards  the  stock  exchange  and  to  the 
participation in it was the fear of loosing control over the firm.  
3. Corporate governance system 
3.1. Legal background for the system of corporate governance 
3.1.1. Model of corporate governance 
The so-called Continental model of corporate governance is adopted in Kyrgyzstan. 
Unlike in the Anglo-Saxon model that consists of two governing bodies – the general meeting 
of shareholders (that fulfills ownership functions) and the board of directors (that fulfils the 
functions of management and supervision), in the Continental model functions of control and 
supervision functions are strengthened by their separation. This model consists of three bod-
ies – general meeting of shareholders, managing body (executive board in charge of day-to-
day  management)  and  supervising  body  (supervisory  board  which  in  KR  is  somewhat 
misleadingly called the board of directors). A person cannot sit on the both boards at the 
same time. In the majority of post-communist countries this very model is adopted as in the 
transition economies, where the so-called mechanisms of external control (in the form of 
financial, commodities and other markets) are still not efficient enough, the so-called internal 
control performed by owners becomes crucially important. In Poland, for example, the three-
tier system of corporate governance applies not only to all joint-stock companies, but also to 
significant part of limited liability companies.   
On 24 November 1994, the Regulation “On Corporate Governance” was issued by the 
KR government. The order of introducing corporate governance in companies, the functions 
of board of directors, executive boards and managers, relations with state bodies and owners 
are defined there. The further development of legislative basis in the sphere of corporate 
governance was strengthened in the first part of the Civil Code passed in May 8 1996 and in 
the Company Law passed in November 15, 1996.  
The Civil Code and the Company Law were both too general, and in the country having 
no experience in corporate governance in the conditions of private property and market, the 
                                                 
21 I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. Kan, S. Kuklin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh pred-Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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lack of instructive elements of legal acts was evident. The laws were also contradictory and 
frequently not precise. On July 26, 1997 the KR government issued the Manual for Corporate 
Governance in KR. It was an accompanying document for the Model Charter of a Joint-stock 
Company. 
The concept of corporate governance, principles put at its foundations, schemes of 
corporate  governance  used  in  other  countries  were  written  in  details.  This  document  al-
though being very up to date, confused many people by using unfamiliar terms, not foreseen 
by legislation and its style pretty much reminded the popular article in the economic journal. 
Standard Charter of a joint-stock company also can’t be unambiguously evaluated. On the 
one hand it made the vague and incomplete definitions of laws more understandable, but on 
the other its concretization very often restricted the possibilities given to shareholders the by 
the law as officials required the company charter to be in accordance with the Model Charter 
(i.e., de facto the document of a lower rank had more power than the higher one). 
On 28 January 2003, after three readings and almost two years of discussion in the 
Parliament  (Jogorku  Kenesh),  the  Act  on  Joint-stock  Companies  was  adopted.  All  other 
norms related to JSCs mentioned above lost their power, apart from the Civil Code.  
The law confirmed the Continental character of the corporate governance model. The 
bodies of a joint-stock company are:  
•  General meeting of shareholders – the supreme body in a company. The questions 
related to charters, reorganization and liquidation of the company, decision making on 
large transactions, elections of a general director, elections of members of the execu-
tive body, board of directors and members of auditing commission, decisions on the 
amount and order of dividends’ payments, remuneration and other vital aspects of the 
company are in the jurisdiction of this body. 
•  Board of directors – body that governs the company in the period between the gen-
eral meetings of shareholders. Its exclusive competence is the decisions on the strate-
gic goals of the company, formation of its policy and supervision of their implementa-
tion by the executive body.  
•  Executive body – the body that manages the day-to-day activity of the company.
22 
This body implements the decisions of the general meeting of shareholders and the 
board of directors, prepares the annual report and budget, and makes reports on finan-
cial and economic activity of the company. It also reports on achievement of the com-
pany’s policy and targets. 
•  Auditing commission is the body that controls financial and economic activity of the 
company. 
                                                                                                                                                         
priyatiy Kyrgyzstana. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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There is a restriction on the combination of functions in the bodies. Members of the ex-
ecutive body and the auditing commission can’t be members of the board of directors at the 
same time. Deputies of Jogorku Kenesh (full-time, i.e., not working elsewhere), members of 
the government and other state officials can’t be members of a board of directors, an execu-
tive body or an auditing commission. 
The adoption of the Act on Joint-stock Companies meant the significant improvement 
in the legal base of corporate governance. First of all, we should mark out its high detailed 
elaboration – the law, finally, became (at least theoretically) not only a regulator but also a 
kind of a manual for companies. However, its actual users point out that the law is badly pre-
pared from the  legal  point  of  view.  Apart from  lack  of  sense  and  contradictions  of  some 
norms of the law, they point out the weak knowledge of legal language by the authors of the 
law. 
The level of property rights protection on a company level is still not optimal. First of all, 
the legislation was devised under powerful impression of Anglo–Saxon model with its charac-
teristic dispersed  ownership  and  related  to  it  protection  of minority  shareholders.  It gives 
preferences to minority owners and insiders and restricts the opportunities of large external 
shareholders to purchase shares. But the reality of the Kyrgyz economy causes that minor 
owners are and in foreseeable future will be a small category of investors. Moreover, experi-
ence of other countries in the region shows that minority shareholders can be used by some 
financial–industrial interest groups for a hostile take-over of a company. Insiders, in turn, 
don’t have sufficient potential to improve functioning of their company. Secondly, there is no 
legal requirement to increase the authorized capital after a new issue of shares. This peculi-
arity comes from the idea, that additional expenses on registration of increased authorized 
capital are too high for many companies and therefore they would refrain from additional 
capitalization. But such a provision distorts the information on the potential of the company 
(and may impede attraction of further investments) and limits their responsibility to creditors. 
And finally, the role and functions of the board of directors is not clearly defined in the law, 
thus weakening the protection of interests of the main categories of shareholders and the 
company itself. 
Among other serious faults that were discovered in the course of implementation of this 
act  and  hinder  the  effective  implementation  of  corporate  governance,  the  most  common 
problems  concern  investors,  quorum  on  the  annual  general  meetings,  board  of  directors 
elections, large transactions, protection of the shareholders rights to participate in meetings 
and their voting rights, as well as competencies and methods of creation of the bodies of a 
joint-stock company. 
                                                                                                                                                         
22 It can be individual or collective (directorate, managing board). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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3.1.2. Disclosure 
A number of internal problems of corporate governance is related to the fact that own-
ers do not directly participate in the process of managing the company and pass their rights 
to managers. Thus the problem with informing arises. Owners have much less information on 
financial situation and technical problems and day-to-day functioning of the company, while 
managers who perform everyday management have sufficient knowledge and skills to un-
derstand and effectively use such information.
23 
The provision of such information to the owners in sufficient amount and up to date is 
therefore a very important legal task.  
The process and order of information disclosure is regulated by the Act on Joint-stock 
Companies and the Regulation “On Disclosure Requirements on the Securities Market”.
24  
The Act defines a list of documents to which the management of a company must pro-
vide  access  for  shareholders.  They  are:  constitutive  documentation,  annual,  quarter  and 
other reports, issue prospectus, general meetings, board of directors and auditing committee 
meetings’ minutes, lists of affiliated persons with information on amount and category of the 
shares they possess, and other documents envisaged by the law of KR, company’s charter, 
decisions of the general meeting of shareholders and the board of directors. 
In the Regulation “On Disclosure Requirements on the Securities Market” the order and 
scope of information disclosure is defined for the following players of the securities market: 
•  issuers; 
•  professional participants of the securities market; 
•  self–regulating organizations; 
•  owners of securities; 
The regulation also includes the order of report submission by the above-mentioned 
persons and organizations to the state body in charge of the stock market regulation. 
In order to provide additional protection of property rights a new unit within the SCSM 
structure was created in 2001: the State Fund for Storage and Processing of the Securities 
Market Information. The main task of the fund is the increasing of transparency of the securi-
ties market mainly through disclosure.  
Currently the only evidence of its activity is disclosure of information on a purchase of 
5% of shares in JSCs. This information is presented and is regularly updated on the website 
of the SCSM.  
                                                 
23 Manual on corporate governance. 
24 Approved by the State Commission for Securities Market on December 16, 2002. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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According to professional participants of the securities market, not a single company 
wants to expose its secrets to its shareholders. And the control over corporate relations is not 
performed by any specific structure. 
3.1.3. Antimonopoly regulation 
The  Act  on  Joint-stock Companies  defines  some  mechanisms for  merging,  acquisi-
tions, splitting, spin-off and reorganization of joint-stock companies. The questions of reor-
ganization are solved by the majority of votes on the general meeting of shareholders. Quo-
rum is achieved if 60% of shareholders, including the holders of privileged shares are pre-
sent. As a rule, the decision is made according to the interests of major shareholders. The 
state has no means of influence on the decision-making in favor of minor shareholders. Such 
means of influence become active only when there is a violation of antimonopoly legislation.  
The  National  Committee  for  Protection  and  Development  of  Competition  under  the 
President of KR (NCPDC) is in charge of antimonopoly regulation. This structure functions 
according to the Act on Restrictions on Monopoly Activity, Development and Protection of 
Competition adopted in 1994 and amended in 2003. According to the law, no company can 
occupy a dominant position on the market as it will hinder the development of competitive 
environment.  The  position  is  considered  dominant  when  the  company’  product  occupies 
more than 35% of the product’ market.
25 
The NCPDC supervises merging or acquisition of joint-stock companies in order not to 
allow for forming a monopolist. That is why the reorganization procedures in joint-stock com-
panies that lead to expansion of their activities require a permission of the NCPDC. 
If a joint-stock company that has a dominant position exercise monopolistic activity or 
its actions substantially limit competition, the NCPDC has the right to make the following de-
cision:  
•  to perform a mandatory split; 
•  to exact undue profits; 
•  to charge for a damage, including lost profits of the companies from the given market 
segment;  
•  to impose a fine.  
Nevertheless, in the conditions of underdeveloped monitoring systems and lack of ex-
perience, it is hard to prove a dominant position of a company. In practice, there were no 
cases of splitting a monopolist.  
                                                 
25 In some cases limits for a market share is set by the antimonopoly body.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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3.1.4. Bankruptcy  
Another very important from the corporate governance point of view is the Act on Bank-
ruptcy adopted in 1997 and changed several times since then. According to the law, a pro-
cedure of special administration (liquidation or reorganization) is applied to the joint-stock 
company  that  is  declared  bankrupt.  Bankruptcy  procedure  can  be  initiated  a  debtor. The 
minimal required debt sum is 5000 minimal salaries
26. 
3.2. Mechanisms of corporate governance 
3.2.1. Large shareholders 
As it was mentioned above, the legislation of KR gives preference to the protection of 
small investors and insiders, which is a doubtful strategy in the conditions requiring the at-
traction of large external owners. The following methods are used to protect insiders and mi-
nority shareholders: 
•  in case of public offer of shares and securities by a company, the existing shareholders 
have a pre-emptive right for the new issue proportionally for the amount of shares be-
longing to them. Taking into account the initially insider-dominated ownership structure 
of privatized companies, this leads to the large concentration of shares in the hands of 
one  shareholder  or  a  group  of  shareholders  without  “outsiderization”  of  ownership 
structure; 
•  the law requires a person who wants to acquire more than 50% of a company’s shares 
(together with the already possessed shares) must send a written request for the pur-
chasing of the shares to all the other shareholders (mandatory bid); 
•  the specific procedure of re-evaluation of shares of the initial issue after an additional 
issue that applies only to privatized companies.  
Any physical or legal person that has the direct or indirect influence on decision-making 
in a joint-stock company is regarded as an affiliated person. According to the law, managers 
and shareholders having five or more percent of voting shares of the company are defined as 
affiliated. The holders of more than 5% of shares have to inform the company and the SCSM 
about the amount and category of the shares that they possess. 
The above-mentioned peculiarity of KR is a great role (at least formal) of the State as 
an owner. By the end of 2004, the State had shares in 148 joint-stock and LLC companies in 
various branches of the economy. The total value of the state share in them is 10,312 million 
                                                 
26 Minimal salary in KR is 100 soms. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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soms or 68% of all the estimated value of state-owned enterprises included in privatization 
process. The State has shares in 132 joint-stock companies. In 85 joint-stock companies the 
State has the controlling block of shares, so the State is interested in taking part in managing 
these companies. 
In such a case, the State has to solve several tasks: on the one hand, this is asset 
management and on the other hand this is the task to provide for the state representation in 
the bodies of a company. The following regulations were developed to solve these issues:  
•  “On the Order and Conditions of Management Buy-ins in Selected joint-stock Compa-
nies Owned by the State;” 
•  “On the State Representatives On the Boards of Directors of Joint-stock Companies 
Owned by the State.” 
The regulation “On the Provision of the State Interests in the Bodies of the Joint-stock 
Companies Owned (Partially Owned) by the State” was also adopted.
27 
According to the Regulation, candidates for boards of directors and executive bodies of 
joint-stock companies that have strategic importance for the economic security of the repub-
lic are recommended by the President of KR according to the Decree of the President of KR 
“On the Creation of the Stable System of Corporate Governance in KR” of October 22, 1998 
and by Prime Minister of KR according to the decision of the KR government “On Improving 
Corporate Governance in Joint-stock Companies with the State Block of Shares” adopted on 
August 18, 2003.  
The list of companies having strategic importance for the republic is defined and ap-
proved in this Regulation. Candidates for positions of chairs and members of boards of direc-
tors and executive bodies of joint-stock companies from this list are recommended by the 
Prime Minister and are approved on the general meeting of shareholders, regardless the size 
of the State share. When the State is not a majority shareholder, it leads to serious conflicts 
of interests. 
One more instrument (practically not working) is the “golden share.” 
On the basis of surveys and interviews with specialists it can be said that the role of 
non-state large owners in KR companies is very great. First, at many joint-stock companies 
(including the majority of privatized companies) there was no separation between ownership 
and management – top managers are at the same time the largest shareholders. Secondly, 
even when these functions are separated, owners have tendencies to directly managing of 
the company, disregarding the existing laws and procedures. On the other hand, the survey 
                                                 
27 Amended on January 18, 1999, September 1, 2001, October 11, 2001, and July 8, 2004.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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of 2000 showed that in the companies owned by large external shareholders the division of 
these two functions is greater and official procedures are used.
28  
It is hard to say anything about conflicts between large and small owners, especially 
taking into account the fact that the latter are mainly employees of these companies and that 
there are practically no external minority shareholders in the country. The situation inside 
companies looks quite docile. However, one can expect escalation of conflicts caused by at-
tempts of outsiders to gain control over companies. So far, all the surveys show that hostile 
takeovers happen very seldom and that in general, the process of ownership “outsideriza-
tion” is very slow. Development of market economy will accelerate these processes, so we 
can expect that conflicts between insiders (who are afraid of losing control over their compa-
nies) and potential outside investors will broaden. 
3.2.2. Executive body and board of directors 
The above-mentioned survey of 2000 shows that the composition of executive bodies 
in most companies is characterized by high level of reproduction of the elites of the trans-
formed state-owned enterprise. More than 80% of the current members of executive bodies 
worked in these companies before privatization and about 70% of them occupied managerial 
positions. In 63% of companies the chairman of the executive body previously was the gen-
eral director of the same enterprise. In 2/3 of companies there was no substantial change in 
the managing elite. As it could be expected, most often persons of insider origin occupied the 
seats  in  executive  bodies  in  companies  with  ownership  structure  dominated  by  non-
managerial employees, and least often — where owners were large external investors. Out-
siders occupied averagely less than 20% of seats in executive bodies and in 44% of compa-
nies there were no top managers “from outside” at all (see Table 4). 
The  changes  in  composition  of  executive  bodies  that  took  place  after  privatization, 
were to some extent related to the changes of in ownership structure. Very frequently, when 
ownership structure changed, a complete change of management happened; where there 
were  no  changes  in  ownership  structure,  the  changes  in  management  bore  an  evolution 
character. 
The tasks of a board of directors in the system of bodies of a joint-stock company de-
fine the specificity of its composition. The function of this body in the Continental model of 
corporate governance is the supervision of company’ activities in the interests of the com-
pany and its owners. It doesn’t mean that all the main categories of shareholders must send 
their representatives there or personally participate in its work. In developed countries spe-
cialists from various spheres of company’s functioning are invited to this body. Frequently, 
                                                 
28 I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. Kan, S. Kuklin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh pred-
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board of directors becomes the place for coordination of interests of owners and other stake-
holders, so representatives of employees, banks, suppliers, and customers can be included 
there.  
Table 4 
Composition of the executive bodies and the largest owner (in %) 
Position before privatization  The State  External 






Worked at the enterprise:  78.2  70.5  85.1  92.2  80.9 
1. As a director  20.8  21.7  24.2  18.5  21.7 
2.  As  a  vice-director,  chief  accountant,  chief  engi-
neer  31.8  22.0  32.6  36.0  30.1 
3. Other managerial  18.8  15.7  20.8  23.6  19.5 
4. Non-managerial  6.7  11.2  7.6  14.1  9.6 
Didn’t work at the enterprise:  21.8  29.5  14.9  7.8  19.1 
1. Managerial positions at a SOE  9.2  9.3  5.4  1.2  6.5 
2. Manager in the private sector  3.8  6.5  2.2  0.4  3.4 
3. In state administration  3.1  0.8  1.5  0.7  1.5 
4. In local administration  0.5  1.7  0.8  0.4  0.9 
5. Private entrepreneur  3.1  2.7  2.3  3.8  2.9 
6. Pensioner  -  0.9  -  -  0.2 
7. Other  2.1  7.7  2.8  1.3  3.7 
Source: I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. Kan, S. Kuklin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh 
predpriyatiy Kyrgyzstana. 
 
In Kyrgyz companies, the formation and further evolution of board of directors’ compo-
sition were similar to the processes that took place in executive bodies with the only differ-
ence that the law provides the opportunity for cumulative voting and election of “their own” 
members of board of directors. The degree of direct reproduction of elites in boards of direc-
tors is lower than in executive bodies but their vertical reproduction (significant percent of 
members of board of directors who previously were non-managerial employees of the com-
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Table 5 
Composition of the boards of directors and the largest owner (in %)  
Position outside of board of directors  The State  External 






Work at the enterprise:  45.6  59.0  72.2  74.9  63.1 
1 On managerial positions  26.9  34.3  37.5  41.2  35.0 
2. On non managing positions  18.7  24.6  34.7  33.6  28.1 
Do not work at the enterprise:  54.4  41.0  27.8  25.1  36.9 
1. Managerial positions at a SOE  14.9  2.4  6.9  1.5  6.1 
2. Manager in the private sector  3.9  17.2  6.3  7.4  9.4 
3. In state administration  15.2  1.8  1.0  2.7  4.5 
4. In local administration  1.0  -  -  -  0.2 
5. In banks  2.0  1.5  -  0.9  1.1 
6. Private entrepreneur  1.7  5.3  6.5  6.4  5.1 
7. Representative of a foreign investor  1.4  8.0  -  0.9  2.9 
8. Representative of the State  12.9  1.9  1.0  -  3.5 
9. Pensioner  -  -  1.6  2.4  0.9 
10. Other  1.4  3.0  4.7  3.0  3.2 
Source: I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. Kan, S. Kuklin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh 
predpriyatiy Kyrgyzstana. 
 
Analysis of the board of directors composition and the fact that the majority of its mem-
bers (more than 80%) were also the owners can allow us to make two conclusions. First, 
owners prefer to participate personally in ownership supervision and not to send their quali-
fied representatives there and secondly, the share of interests group representatives not be-
ing owners (i.e., stakeholders) seems to be very low. Institution of independent members of 
the board of directors doesn’t practically exist.  
The right  distribution  of functions  between  these  two  bodies,  including  the  effective 
control of board of directors over the work of managers is very important for effective corpo-
rate governance. The 2000 survey shows that according to respondents’ opinion the most 
influential group that affects the most important aspects of decision-making are the executive 
bodies. A high role of the general meeting of shareholders is most often pointed out  in the 
companies where non-managerial employees prevail in the ownership structure. All that is 
logical in the light of the conclusion made above about the role of owners in management. 
The board of directors is perceived as the most important body only in a small group of com-
panies, where the main owner is a large external investor (in companies controlled by insid-
ers this body is the fifth on the influence scale).  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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Table 6 
Degree of influence on decision-making process and the largest owner (average value on 
the scale from 1 – least important to 7 – very important)  









Director (chairman of executive body)  6.39  6.33  6.20  6.59  6.35 
Executive body  5.55  6.05  5.78  6.04  5.85 
General meeting of shareholders  5.85  5.54  5.70  6.30  5.80 
Board of directors  4.73  5.64  4.78  5.26  5.09 
Owners of large blocks of shares  4.91  5.31  5.41  4.15  5.03 
Employees  4.56  4.40  4.49  5.30  4.63 
Trade union  3.15  3.35  2.95  3.31  3.17 
Local administration  3.39  2.58  2.50  3.22  2.86 
Central administration (ministries etc.)  3.76  2.40  2.19  2.33  2.64 
Management of a holding, group, concern (where ap-
plicable) 
2.44  1.98  1.84  2.08  2.06 
Managing group (where applicable)  2.16  2.00  1.93  2.19  2.05 
Foreign investor (where applicable)  2.17  2.66  1.55  1.74  2.02 




Who participates in the most important strategic decisions (in %) 
Decisions are made by: 















The State  21.2  27.3  -  -  21.2  30.3 
External investors  12.5  25.0  5.0  2.5  32.5  22.5 
Managers  13.0  32.6  6.5  2.2  32.6  13.0 
Non-managerial em-
ployees  14.8  18.5  -  7.4  14.8  44.4 
Total  14.1  25.5  3.4  2.7  26.8  27.5 
Source: I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. Kan, S. Kuklin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh 
predpriyatiy Kyrgyzstana. 
 
The  surveys  showed  that  the  real  powers  (both  formal  and  existing  in  practice)  of 
boards of directors at the enterprises under review were broader than the minimum required 
by the law. At the same time, quite often boards of directors didn’t have the powers that were 
not only rational for this body, but also required by the legislation of KR. On the other hand, 
the majority of boards of directors were given powers that belonged to other bodies. In prac-
tice  however,  at  least  in  1999–2000,  boards  of  directors  didn’t  always  use  the  powers 
granted to them. Even the most important powers were used in less than 75% of enterprises. 
Of course boards of directors couldn’t use some rights during two years as there was no 
need in them (appointment of top managers, approval of large transactions etc.), but the ma-
jority of powers should have been used on the regular basis (see Table 8). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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Table 8 
Powers of boards of directors of the surveyed enterprises (in % of enterprises where this 
power is present or is used)  
Powers used in 1999-2000 
The largest owner: 
Powers  Powers 












Powers that must be taken upon by boards of directors  
Approval of directions of the executive body’s activities  80  75  71  72  85  64 
Agreement to change the terms of activities of the JSC  72  60  54  58  59  68 
Remuneration of the executive body members  66  57  58  64  53  55 
Approval of development plans  71  62  58  61  62  68 
Agreement to change the type of activity of the JSC  66  50  54  56  50  45 
Approval of large investments  63  48  50  53  50  36 
Approval of large transactions  69  55  54  67  50  45 
Approval of merging with another JSC, split  56  43  46  56  38  32 
Approval of selling and purchasing of shares  57  42  42  36  56  27 
Supervision and evaluation of the executive body’s activ-
ity 
78  72  83  72  62  73 
Supervision of owners interests  54  43  25  44  56  50 
Powers that must be taken upon by other bodies 
Firing and hiring of members of the executive body*  57  46  46  44  50  41 
Coordination of selling/purchasing of real estate*  73  63  67  75  62  50 
Coordination of new obligations*  59  46  46  56  38  41 
Approval of balance and other financial documents  73  72  63  67  76  82 
Approval of the company’ charter  58  51  50  44  53  55 
Approval of organizational regulations of the JSC  50  40  42  36  38  50 
Approval of profit distribution  63  58  54  47  62  73 
Approval of tariff scale  42  36  17  39  41  50 
Approval of production plans  51  38  37  42  41  36 
Approval of changes in the authorized capital  68  49  50  44  59  45 
Supervision of accounts department and documents  62  54  46  58  47  64 
Supervision of economic activity of the JSC  68  56  67  50  53  64 
Control of agreements  46  38  29  36  38  55 
Quality control  41  33  25  31  41  36 
Supervision of the implementation of decisions made by 
the  general  meeting  of  shareholders  or  the  executive 
body   72  62  67  61  62  64 
Supervision of labor protection regulations  49  37  25  33  50  45 
Supervision of employees’ interests  53  43  33  44  47  55 
* In some cases these powers can be passed to the board of directors. 
Maximum values of the variables for enterprises with different ownership structure are marked bold.  
Source: I. Lukashova, G. Freyuk, P. Kozarzewski (ed.), O. Kan, S. Kuklin, Privatizatsiya promyshlennykh 
predpriyatiy Kyrgyzstana. 
 
There were some differences in the use of powers of board of directors in JSCs with 
different ownership structure. Boards of directors in enterprises characterized by ownership 
prevalence of: 
– the State – were relatively passive;  
– non-state outsiders – were generally active in a way relatively most compliant with 
the Continental corporate governance model;  
– managers – were not very active and their activity was oriented mainly on problems 
of property and management; Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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– non-managerial employees – were relatively active but their activity, as a rule, was 
overlapping with functions of other bodies – general meeting, auditing committee and even 
trade union. 
In general, it can be concluded that supervision functions in the majority of joint-stock 
companies are unsatisfactory. One of the main reasons is the gnoseological one – there was 
not such a function in state-owned enterprises. Thus, the realization of its importance and 
specificity of its implementation in joint-stock companies (most of which are privatized SOEs) 
in most cases proved to be extremely hard. New owners of companies, especially insiders, 
very often don’t understand why the separate supervision should exist when the body that 
represents owners (general meeting of shareholders) already exists and could supervise the 
realization of shareholders’ interests. At the same time, the interests of a company itself or 
the use of board of directors as a platform of coordination of interests are for the majority of 
owners a simple abstraction. 
3.2.3. Market of corporate control 
This is perhaps the least researched topic in KR. On the basis of some information it 
can be presumed that this market is not very developed yet. In any case there was nothing in 
the country that reminded at least slightly, the terse and broad property redistribution that 
happened in Russia. It can be explained to some extent by lack of really attractive objects in 
KR. There are no oligarchs (in Russian notion) in the country. 
There wasn’t also any significant revision of privatization results. But there is a danger 
that these processes will become stronger after the March 2005 revolution in the process of 
which there was a takeover of some private and state property. The revolution itself was held 
under the slogans of revision of the privatization results. So we can expect some commotion 
on the market of corporate control, although not because of its development and increased 
“civilization,” but because of the lack of consolidation in the reform process. 
The main mechanisms of property redistribution are very typical – first of all this is the 
purchase of stocks from shareholders and very rarely on the stock exchange (because the 
organized stock market is underdeveloped). 
One of the violations of corporate governance principles is the incorrect behavior of 
registrars of joint-stock companies (e.g., information disclosure and insider trading). In 2004, 
the “Capital” financial company being the official registrar of  the “Promstroibank” commercial 
bank on the one hand and an interested stock market player on the other hand started to 
massively purchase shares from minority shareholders of “Promstroibank.” Thus having the 
information about the shareholders of “Promstroibank,” “Capital” attempted to perform a hos-
tile takeover. This attempt was successfully blocked, but there were no sanctions applied to 
“Capital” for these illegal actions. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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There were also cases of illegal taking over property by force and change of owner with 
the help of court and administrative procedures. 
The impact of ownership redistribution on disciplining managers is not well researched. 
It is probably not very big as the property market is shallow, the pressure of potential inves-
tors on companies is lacking and there is a widespread combination of ownership and mana-
gerial functions in companies. In such conditions managers and companies can easily defy 
the third parties which try to take over their companies. 
Legal methods of protection are very standard and are described above. They are de-
fined  by  the  Acts  On  Securities  Market  and  On  Joint-stock  Companies.  This  is  the  pre-
emptive right of shareholders to purchase the newly issued shares, mandatory bids, imple-
mentation of restrictions on circulation of shares in the charters of joint-stock companies, an-
timonopoly regulation, etc. Besides, the shareholders of privatized companies are addition-
ally protected by special procedure of re-evaluation of “old” shares after a new issue. 
3.3. The role of stakeholders 
The role of stakeholders is not legally regulated and is practically very small. Legisla-
tion doesn’t require the presence of representatives of stakeholders in the bodies of a joint-
stock company. But in the process of privatization the role of company’s employees was very 
significant and it influenced the formation of corporate governance in the private sector of the 
economy. Informal influence of stakeholders on the work of companies is very heterogene-
ous. In companies where dispersed insider ownership dominates, the informal influence of 
non-managerial employees is quite strong. In companies with large debts, we can see the 
substantial role of creditors, who sometimes are able to take over the property. In companies 
with a large share of the state, formal and informal influence of the state administration is 
significant. 
3.4. Problems of implementation of the corporate governance 
system 
In order for the system of corporate governance to work in full power, a coherent legis-
lative base is needed where all the documents and regulations fit each other. Currently the 
norms of the Act on Joint-stock Companies contradict many legal acts of ministries and other 
state bodies, laws of KR and even the Constitution of KR.
29 The lack of precise system of 
laws’ priorities makes aggravates this problem. 
                                                 
29 E.T. Taranchiev, Osobennosti primeneniya Zakona Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki “Ob aktsionernykh obschest-
vakh” i voprosy korporativnoy kultury, “Pravo i Predprinimatelstvo”,  2003-2004. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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Members of expert committee of the SCSM in which the most remarkable participants 
of stock market are included and who constantly face the problems created by the contradic-
tions of legislation, suggested the project of amendments in the Act on Joint-stock Compa-
nies. Adoption of the suggestions made by the expert committee would benefit the practice of 
corporate governance. Besides, experts think that the Act on Securities Market must be re-
vised in order to correspond to the Act on Joint-stock companies as the current corporate 
governance problems originate mainly from the contradictions between the two laws.   
The practice of corporate relations showed that participants of such relations are very 
reluctant to apply to court. This is due to prolonged procedures of decision-making in such 
cases and underdeveloped procedures of mandatory fulfillment of courts’ decisions. There 
were some examples, when the newly elected management couldn’t start working as the 
former management, removed from the position by court’s decision hindered its work.  
According to opinions of many professional participants of stock market, the SPF is one 
of the largest violators of legislation, which impedes the implementation of effective corporate 
governance. Its double standards of operation put the legality of many of its decisions under 
doubt.  
In most cases privatization in Kyrgyzstan resulted neither in the better functioning of 
enterprises nor in their take-over by more efficient owners, due to a distorted institutional and 
legislative environment and inefficient corporate governance regime: 
•  ownership structures are not efficient and transparent enough with an excessive role 
for insiders (managers) and external owners who are tied up with the socialist past; this 
makes overcoming the legacy of “socialist enterprise” difficult: managers’ ways of think-
ing have been formed in the planned economy, there is a lack of market experience 
and low corporate governance culture;  
•  enterprises adaptation to the distorted external institutional and legislative environment 
has led to the strengthening of non-market behavior (barter transactions, non-payment 
culture, in-kind wages and salaries, etc), which have been difficult to get rid of subse-
quently (though recently the role of such behavior has decreased significantly). It is sig-
nificant that in the middle of the nineties such deviational forms of behavior were very 
developed in companies owned by non-state concentrated owners, as these firms had 
the best adaptive capabilities;
30 
•  external environment (lack of real estate tax and effective bankruptcy procedures, limi-
tations on a free market turnover of property rights) does not stimulate owners and 
managers to increase the economic efficiency of their enterprises, including the option 
of selling them to more effective owners;   Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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•  lack  of  effective  separation  of  ownership,  management  and  supervision  functions: 
owners usually directly participate in the management of enterprises;  
•  extremely weak and distorted supervision: boards of directors very often play purely a 
formal role; they represent the interests of the owners only and do not protect the inter-
ests of the company as such;  
•  legal  regulation  of  corporate  governance  does  not  define  and  distinguish  clearly 
enough the functions, rights and responsibilities of enterprise governing bodies;  
•  weak and distorted role of the state as owner: in fact, the State Property Committee 
does not exercise effective ownership control of state-owned enterprises and blocks of 
shares that belong to the state, which leads to the situation of ownership vacuum, in-
formal control of managers and government officials, and asset stripping.  
3.5. Non-legislative methods of improving corporate 
governance  
No matter how perfect the legislative base of corporate governance is, the implementa-
tion of effective decisions is impossible without some changes coming from outside of the 
legal sphere. Governments, international organizations, large corporations of the developed 
market  economies  came  to  this  conclusion  long  ago.  This  problem  is  very  vital  in  post-
Communist countries, especially where there is a complete lack of historical experience in 
market economy and in private property and legislative base is far from being perfect. In the 
late nineties in Kyrgyzstan this problem was paid more and more attention.  
3.5.1. Efforts “from above:” Support for corporate governance 
development on the governmental level  
In  1997  Kyrgyzstan  was  given  a  preferential  loan  by  the  Asian  Development  Bank 
(ADB) for creation and implementation of corporate governance standards in companies un-
der the project “Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform.” To implement this task, the 
Center for Corporate Development (CCD) under the apparatus of Prime Minister was organ-
ized. The main task of this structure was the development of legislation in the sphere of cor-
porate governance and securities market. The main effect of its work became the project of 
the Act on Joint-stock Companies, which later was adopted by the Parliament. Besides, the 
CCD  took  active  part  in  the  development  of  legislative  base for  bankruptcy  and  property 
valuation. 
In 2001 the CCD began the implementation of the second stage of ADB credit line for 
the program “Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform.” It was supposed to develop the 
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national standards of corporate governance and to start their implementation. The CCD or-
ganized intensive trainings with the invited foreign consultants on various questions of joint-
stock companies’ management, financial management, international standards of financial 
accounting, strategic planning etc. 
In 2004 the credit line was closed, the CCD stopped its operations and all archives 
were passed to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. Unfortunately this archive 
is not public and it is practically impossible to find any information on the effects of the CCD 
work.  
In the same 2004 the Center for Corporate Development (CCD2) under the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade was founded. The Center is a governmental body re-
sponsible for realization of the technical assistance project of the ADB “Capacity Building for 
Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Procedures” and the program loan of the ADB “Cor-
porate Governance and Enterprise Reform II.” In fact the CCD2 became the follower of the 
CCD having the following tasks: 
•  creation of conditions for the development of corporate governance in KR including the 
OECD principles of corporate governance; 
•  creation of conditions for development and effective use of bankruptcy procedures in 
order to increase the vitality of the enterprise sector and financial recovery of the whole 
economy; 
•  realization  of  the  ADB  technical  assistance  project “Capacity  Building for  Corporate 
Governance and Bankruptcy Procedures” including the fulfillment of the Action Plan for 
2004. The Plan was approved by the Government of KR on March 10, 2004; 
•  meeting the conditions of the ADB program loan “Corporate Governance and Enter-
prise Reform II;” 
•  development of the legal base for corporate governance in KR and assistance to joint-
stock companies in creating the system of internal acts in accordance with the best 
practice of corporate governance; 
•  assistance in creation of favorable investment climate for the stock market, among oth-
ers, by increasing the number of companies being listed on the stock exchange; 
•  increasing the transparency of joint-stock companies operations; 
•  with the help of educational programs, improving knowledge and skills of shareholders, 
creditors, officials, employees of joint-stock companies and other stakeholders in the 
sphere of corporate governance, bankruptcy and other problems related to managing a 
company; 
•  supplying information for the population on principles of corporate governance etc. 
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Despite the broad range of the  tasks set for the CCD2, no publicly seen activities can 
be found now and their website is not updated.  
3.5.2. Efforts “from below:” Self–regulating organizations and 
associations of professional participants of the securities market  
The  legal  base  for  self–regulating  organizations  (SRO)  in  KR  is  the  regulation  “On 
Self–regulating Organizations of Professional Participants of the Securities Market.” Accord-
ing to the regulation, SRO is a non commercial voluntary organization. As a rule, a SRO has 
its ethics code that provides norms for broker and dealer activity.  
There are several SROs working on the securities market. In 1998, for example, a SRO 
status was achieved by the KSE. In 2004 there three more unions of professional partici-
pants of stock market were registered: Association of Independent Depositaries and Regis-
trars “Uyum” (13 members), Association of Investment Institutions (10 members), and Broker 
and Dealer Association (10 members). Professional associations of organizations working in 
adjacent  spheres  can  also  influence  the  development  of  securities  market  and  corporate 
governance. Among them are the Chamber of Tax Consultations, the Union of Accountants 
and  Auditors,  and the Union  of  Kyrgyz  Evaluators. One  of  the  main tasks  of  the  above-
mentioned public organizations is improvement of legislation that regulates their professional 
activity  and  providing  consulting,  survey  and  educational  services.  Currently  almost  all  of 
them are involved in the development of the new version of the Act on Securities Market.”  
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
4.1. Conclusions 
It can be said that there were significant positive changes in the sphere of corporate 
governance in KR. First of all it should be marked that in the country that had no previous 
experience of private property and market, institutions of corporate governance were formed. 
At first they were very formal, but as time went by, they started to be filled with the real con-
tents, especially on a company level. There was a process of learning of both owners and 
managers how to govern the company using the available set of laws and regulations. It was 
gradually turning from formal requirement into vital necessity understood by the majority of 
actors of the corporate governance scene. Apparently the period of confusion after the col-
lapse of the USSR, breaking-off of economic links, and the appearance of the new, unfamil-
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But the process is still far from being complete. Despite the adoption of the potentially 
effective in KR conditions model of corporate governance, the real corporate relations are 
still very dysfunctional (lack of division of functions, problems with creation of effective owner, 
etc.). Limited efficiency of the corporate governance development in the country has the fol-
lowing main reasons:  
First, this is the material and mental heritage of the “real socialism” – corporate gov-
ernance develops manly on basis of privatized SOEs and bears the burden of ineffective for-
mal and informal structures and habits formed in the past.  
Secondly, reforms are not finished yet: the retaining state-controlled sector is still quite 
large and the institutional and legal environment in which companies work is still highly dis-
torted. Currently a lot of companies are quickly adapting in order to survive and develop, but 
they are adapting to the environment that exists now and that is very different from the one in 
developed countries. Besides, the choice of adaptation methods is limited by the experience, 
mental outlook, and skills of the main corporate governance players. 
Third, the country lacks sufficient sources of knowledge and models of behavior in the 
field of corporate governance. In the conditions of prevalent insiderized ownership and very 
low level of foreign investments, especially those from the “first-class,” the external (i.e., that 
emerge outside a company) sources of market mentality and knowledge are virtually absent. 
The majority of owners and managers have to learn mainly on their own mistakes. 
4.2. Recommendations 
Improvement of corporate governance in KR requires a complex approach. Improve-
ment of legislation must be accompanied by active measures aimed at improving the situa-
tion in all spheres that influence the quality of corporate governance. The main task in this 
sphere is creation of favorable legal and institutional climate which would lead to improve-
ment of common norms of corporate governance and to attraction of external investments.  
Protection of property rights should be strengthened according to the spirit of the 
implemented model of corporate governance: 
•  the accent must be shifted from protection of one group of investors (like insiders and 
minority shareholders) to protection of all groups and types of investors and provision 
of the transparency of property transactions and their maximum freedom. This will help 
to redistribute property to more effective owners and to prevent the appearance of oli-
garchic structures. In order to achieve this, privileges of insiders must be reduced (re-
ducing the right to buy shares in new issues, repealing provisions that stipulate the 
possibility of restoring previous proportions in the ownership structure after issuing new 
shares, re-registering closed joint-stock companies as open joint-stock companies or, Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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at least, determining the maximum amount of the charter capital for the former) and re-
sponsibility of shareholders for initiating corporate conflicts must be increased; 
•  supervision over management of a company should be strengthened. This includes, 
among others, strengthening the role of board of directors (see below) and precise 
definition of auditing commission authority; 
•  additional emission of shares must increase the authorized capital; 
•  officially proclaimed slogans of equal legal regime for both domestic and foreign inves-
tors, their rights and responsibilities must be observed. This means that all current re-
strictions for foreign investors should be removed, first of all concerning the right for 
land acquisition and the right for buying certain objects in the course of privatization. 
The government must do everything possible to show investors that KR authorities are 
protecting them, that they protect property rights, creditors’ rights and contract enforcement, 
and that “revolution repartition” of property is stopped and will never happen again and all the 
objects that had been illegally taken over will be returned to their legal owners. 
Corporate  governance  in  companies  must  be  strengthened. First, the functions 
and  powers  of  a  company’s  bodies  must  be  clearly  separated  and  defined.  Secondly, 
strengthening of the role of board of directors is needed. It must not only exercise owners’ 
control over the company, but also perform a number of other vital functions like in the major-
ity of countries with the Continental model of corporate governance (particularly, to perform 
qualified supervision of management in the interests of owners and a company itself, and to 
be a platform for harmonization of various interests). To achieve this, the creation of board of 
directors in all the joint-stock companies should be mandatory and introduction of the institu-
tion of independent members of board of directors is needed. 
The culture of corporate governance  should be developed in order to overcome the 
skills and models of behavior inherited from Soviet times and acquired while functioning in 
the distorted institutional and legal environment of the post-Soviet era. For this purpose, it is 
important to implement the Best Practices Code where the main principles of properly func-
tioning corporate governance in joint-stock companies would be defined. It should also in-
clude concrete recommendations for functioning of a company’s bodies. The use of the Code 
should  be  voluntary,  but  a  company  must  declare  in  its  reports  and  issue  prospectuses 
whether it is going to abide the Code, which regulations of it will be used and not used and 
why (comply or explain principle). Implementation of the Code will allow not only to improve 
the corporate governance in companies, but also to increase the transparency of stock mar-
ket and this, in turn, will give external investors the opportunity to make more effective deci-
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The development of capital markets and provision of their transparency is required. 
The stock market should be developed in the first place, in order to become a source of fi-
nancial resources for enterprises, a tool for their market valuation and one of the most impor-
tant channels of property redistribution. To achieve these goals it is recommended to: 
•  promote the development of the entire stock market and not only the stock exchange, 
and  strengthen  the  transparency  and  property  rights  protection  of  over-the-counter 
transactions;  
•  turn the stock exchange into a high quality and transparent institution following closely 
all the standards related to public offerings (this also concerns listings of state-owned 
minority blocks of shares); at the same time, the KSE should be released from the obli-
gation to take part in over-the-counter transactions;  
•  stimulate development of institutional investors such as investment funds and (in fu-
ture) pension funds to create stable demand for securities; 
•  develop a market for debt instruments (corporate and Treasury bonds, etc.). 
Bankruptcy mechanism should be actively used as a method of companies’ sanitation. 
This mechanism must be well thought out and its use must be strictly controlled so that the 
procedure wouldn’t be used for property takeover and redistribution, as it often takes place in 
many post-Communist countries (e.g., in Russia).  
Privatization of state property must be completed and the participation of state in 
the economy must be radically reduced. The state must not be an entrepreneur. Its reve-
nues  must  consist  of  taxes,  not  dividends  and  its  regulation  function  must  be  performed 
mainly by laws and not by direct management of property. The above considerations call for 
the rapid completion of privatization which requires:  
•  removing the majority of existing bans and limitations on privatization, in particular with 
respect to the majority of infrastructure objects (their privatization should be preceded 
by demonopolization and changes in regulatory mechanisms), science and culture, al-
cohol production, gold mining and certain other natural resources industries;   
•  selling the remaining blocks of shares that are still owned by the state; in the case of 
low demand (especially, for minority blocks) these shares should be sold through auc-
tion without a minimum initial price. 
In order for privatization to be successful well-balanced goals should be set, the main 
of which must be improvement of economic condition of privatized objects (economic goal). 
This  can  be  achieved  by  giving  property to  more  effective  owners,  who  are  not  only  the 
source of investment, but also would lead to improvements in corporate governance and 
would be able to provide access to new technologies, markets etc. Attraction of effective 
owners should be done by: Studies & Analyses CASE No. 326 -  The System of Corporate Governance in Kyrgyzstan… 
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•  improvement of the overall investment and business climate; 
•  granting equal rights to potential domestic and foreign participants of privatization; 
•  active looking for foreign investors, of the “first-class” first of all – successful and trust-
worthy foreign and international corporations.  
Privatization must be understood as a stable process and its results as the final ones. 
The latter can be reviewed only in cases of evident violations of the law and under the condi-
tion of maximum observance of property rights. 
In enterprises with a significant state-owned shareholding (blocking and higher), which 
are to be privatized in the future but — for various reasons — cannot or should not be sold 
immediately, a procedure for management buy-in should be applied. In relation to enterprises 
that are not subject to privatization, one can consider employing experienced foreign manag-
ers. 
In case of enterprises having a special importance for the national economy, the com-
plete  loss  of  control  over  which  is  not  desirable,  one  should  use  the  mechanism  of  the 
“golden share” instead of keeping the controlling block of shares by the state. The “golden 
share” gives the right of veto on the most important strategic issues:  
•  changes and amendments to a joint-stock company charter;  
•  reorganization and liquidation of a joint-stock company; 
•  conclusion of the most important economic contracts, which require the approval of the 
shareholders’ general meeting according to the company charter;  
This right should be exercised at the general meeting of shareholders, and a SPC rep-
resentative should be elected to the board of directors in an advisory capacity. Using the 
“golden share” mechanism will placate those who are afraid of losing state control over these 
enterprises but will limit government interference to a minimum. 
Additional  measures  for  improvement  of  legislation  that  create  environment  for 
corporate governance should be introduced. In particular, current contradictions in the law 
must be removed and the hierarchy of legal acts must be restored in the day-to-day practice. 
 